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Mark Mancini*

The Conceptual Gap Between
Doré and Vavilov

This paper argues that there is a fundamental conceptual gap between the cases of
Doré and Vavilov. This is because both cases are motivated by different conceptions
of administrative law. In Vavilov, the paper suggests that the Court melded together
two theories of judicial review; a Diceyan theory based on a harmonious understanding
of the principles of legislative sovereignty and the Rule of Law; and a “culture of
justification” for administrative decision-makers. On the other hand, Doré is motivated
by a functionalist understanding of administrative law, in which the expertise of decisionmakers is emphasized. The paper explores the doctrinal gap and suggests two ways in
which it might be bridged. First, Doré might be recalibrated to bifurcate the standard of
review analysis, so that decisions implicating the scope of Charter rights are reviewed
more stringently. Second, Vavilov’s justificatory standards might be imported into the
Doré context.
Dans le présent article, nous soutenons qu’il existe un fossé conceptuel fondamental
entre les arrêts Doré et Vavilov. Cela s’explique par le fait que les deux affaires sont
motivées par des conceptions différentes du droit administratif. Dans l’arrêt Vavilov,
nous suggérons que la Cour a fusionné deux théories de la révision judiciaire : la
théorie du juriste Dicey fondée sur une compréhension harmonieuse des principes de
la souveraineté législative et de l’État de droit, et une « culture de la justification » pour
les décideurs administratifs. Par ailleurs, l’arrêt Doré se fonde sur une compréhension
fonctionnaliste du droit administratif, qui met l’accent sur l’expertise des décideurs. Dans
l’article, nous explorons le fossé conceptuel et suggérons deux façons de le combler.
D’abord, l’arrêt Doré pourrait être recalibré afin de réorienter le cadre d’analyse de la
norme du contrôle judiciaire, de sorte que les décisions impliquant la portée des droits
garantis par la Charte soient examinées de façon plus rigoureuse. Deuxièmement, les
normes justificatives énoncées dans l’arrêt Vavilov pourraient être importées dans le
contexte de l’arrêt Doré.

*
Mark Mancini is the National Director of the Runnymede Society. He holds a J.D. from the
University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law and an LL.M. from the University of Chicago Law
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Introduction
Doré is one of the Supreme Court of Canada’s most controversial
administrative law decisions of the 21st century.1 Doré introduced a
standard of review of reasonableness2 for administrative decisions
implicating what the Court called “Charter values.”3 The Court held
that decision-makers must, when exercising statutory discretion, balance
Charter values with statutory objectives,4 and the question on judicial
review is whether the balancing was reasonably proportionate in light of
those values.5 In other words, the traditional Oakes test would not apply
in situations where the Charter challenge is aimed at administrative
discretion rather than a statute. Overall, Doré was designed to introduce a
more unified public law into Canadian constitutional adjudication, where

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 [Doré].
Ibid at para 45.
Ibid at paras 54-55.
Ibid at para 55.
Ibid at para 57.
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courts respect constitutional decisions rendered by administrative actors,
provided they are fully reasoned.6
The simple description of the Doré approach elides its many nuances.
For example, the definition of a Charter value is subject to much discussion
in the literature.7 Who bears the onus in determining whether a particular
limit is reasonable is yet another issue that has warranted judicial attention.8
And questions remain about whether reasonableness review is analogous
to the proportionality analysis that is the hallmark of the Oakes test.9
These and other questions have become ever more relevant following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov.10 While Vavilov nominally refused
to consider the continued propriety of the Doré framework,11 a number
of comments in Vavilov can be taken as undermining the conceptual
bases of Doré.12 This raises the question: can Doré survive Vavilov at the
conceptual level?
This article argues that there is a potential conceptual gap between
Vavilov and Doré.13 Put differently, in my view, the latter case cannot
stand without some substantial amendment.14 Indeed, Vavilov and Doré
appear motivated by different views of administrative law and judicial
review. Vavilov, with its focus on the statute as the most “salient” aspect of
review on a reasonableness standard,15 and the Court’s preoccupation with
6.
Matthew Lewans, “Administrative Constitutionalism and the Unity of Public Law” (2018) 55
OHLJ 515 at 518-19 [Lewans, “Unity”]. For more on the concept of the unity of public law, see David
Dyzenhaus, “Baker: The Unity of Public Law” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of Public Law
(Hart Publishing: Portland, 2004) at 1.
7.
See eg Matthew Horner, “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian Constitutionalism”
(2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 361; Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite?: Administrative
Discretion and the Charter” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 561. For a more positive take on the question of
values, see Lorne Sossin & Mark Friedman, “Charter Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67
SCLR (2d) 391.
8.
Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 at para 117 per
McLachlin CJC; see also para 195 per Rowe J [TWU].
9.
Some scholars argue that such a harmony does not or should not exist. See Iryna Ponomarenko,
“Tipping the Scales in the Reasonableness-Proportionality Debate in Canadian Administrative Law”
21 Appeal 125 at 127 [Ponomarenko].
10. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].
11. Ibid at para 57.
12. See Ibid at para 56; see also Mark Mancini, “After Vavilov, Doré is Under Stress,” online:
Double Aspect <https://doubleaspect.blog/2020/01/06/after-vavilov-dore-is-under-stress/> [https://
perma.cc/94R9-VC4U].
13. Some courts have already been faced with the potential gap between Dore and Vavilov: see
Strom v Saskatchewan Registered Nurses’ Association, 2020 SKCA 112. In Strom, the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal did not address the question of “what is the standard of review when the issue of
whether an administrative decision has unjustifiably limited Charter rights is raised on judicial review,
rather than on appeal?” See Strom, at para 133.
14. As I will note below, this difference matters, even despite the different contexts, facts, and
holdings of the two cases.
15. Supra note 10 at para 110.
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reasons,16 tends to straddle two schools of administrative law thought.
First, it incorporates a formalist school motivated by a harmonious
understanding of legislative supremacy and the Rule of Law, championed
by the jurist A.V. Dicey.17 Second, it incorporates a justificatory school,
which focuses on ensuring the exercise of public power is justified,
championed by scholars like David Dyzenhaus.18 On the other hand, Doré,
which is premised on functional19 understandings of the superior expertise
of administrative bodies over constitutional matters arising in their remit,20
is inspired by older approaches associated with the Progressive school of
administrative law.21
These schools, while not necessarily in conflict, call for different
doctrinal applications. On the selection of the standard of review, Vavilov
seems to endorse a broad-based application of the correctness standard on
constitutional questions—contrary to Doré’s retention of the standard of
reasonableness for constitutional questions. And even if reasonableness is
the appropriate standard of review, Vavilov’s new reasonableness standard,
focused as it is on justification, appears potentially more intensive than
Doré reasonableness,22 as it has been applied in cases subsequent to

16. Canada Post Corp v Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67 at para 26: reasons-first
approach.
17. AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885)
[Dicey, “Introduction”].
18. David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture”
(1998) 14 S Afr J on Hum Rts 11 [Dyzenhaus, “Justification”]; David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of
Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Michael Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) at 279 [Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference”].
19. For a good description of the theoretical underpinnings of functionalism as a school of
administrative law thought, see Martin Loughlin, “The Functionalist Style in Public Law (2005) 55:3
UTLJ 361-403 [Loughlin].
20. See, for the distinction between formalism and functionalism in Canadian Administrative
law, John Willis, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the
Functional” (1935–1936) 1 UTLJ 53 [Willis].
21. See, in the American context, Ronald J Pestritto, “The Progressive Origins of the Administrative
State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis” (2007) 24:1 Social Philosophy & Policy 24; in the Canadian
context, see, for example, Willis supra note 20; and Harry Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law:
A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17:1 OHLJ 1 [Arthurs, “Dicey”] ; R Blake Brown, “The Canadian
Legal Realists and Administrative Law Scholarship, 1930–1941” [Brown]; Harry Arthurs, “Protection
Against Judicial Review” (1983) 43:2 R du B 277 [Arthurs, “Protection”]; Harry Arthurs, “Woe Unto
You, Judges: Or How Reading Frankfurter and Greene, Ruined Me as a Labour Lawyer and Made Me
as an Academic” (2002) 29 JL & Soc’y 657 [Arthurs, “Woe Unto You”]; Peter Hogg, “Judicial Review
in Canada: How Much Do We Need It?” (1974) 26:3 Admin L Rev 337 [Hogg].
22. As I will note, there are good arguments on both sides of the question that Vavilovian
reasonableness is more stringent. But as I will explain below, to my mind, it is true that reasonableness
as applied in Vavilov is more stringent than the reasonableness standard that has characterized cases
applying Doré, like TWU.
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Doré .23 All of this leaves Doré in a position of vulnerability, if Vavilov is
followed on principle.
The paper proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I set out the facts and holdings
of Vavilov and Doré. In Part II, I evaluate the core theories underlying
Vavilov: namely, a focus on Diceyanism and a reasons-focused “culture
of justification” theory. In Part III, I evaluate the theory of Doré, which
is basically a functionalist theory focused on the expertise of decisionmakers in contributing to constitutional discourse. I ultimately conclude
that these differences in concept lead to three distinct doctrinal differences
between Doré and Vavilov: (1) a change in approach on expertise (2) a
difference in the role of the courts in each case and (3) a lesser requirement
for reasons in Doré compared to Vavilov. Finally, in Part IV, I evaluate two
options for bridging the conceptual gap between Doré and Vavilov: (1)
bifurcating the standard of review, and (2) stricter reasonableness review.
I review the benefits and drawbacks of each of these options.
I. Doré and Vavilov
Doré and Vavilov, in my view, present different schools of administrative
law that call for different doctrinal applications. Before turning to that
important point, I outline the two cases, describing and analyzing the
theories underpinning each decision.
1. Doré
Doré involved a lawyer who wrote a vituperative letter to a judge, for
which he was sanctioned by the Disciplinary Council of the Barreau
du Quebec.24 Mr. Doré argued that “the manner in which the relevant
legislation was applied by the Disciplinary Council was unconstitutional
because his comments were protected by s.2(b) of the Charter.”25 In
reviewing this argument, the Supreme Court in Doré set out to clarify “the
appropriate framework to be applied in reviewing administrative decisions
for compliance with Charter values.”26 The Court imposed a starting
requirement: “[i]t goes without saying that administrative decision-makers
must act consistently with the values underlying the grant of discretion,
including Charter values.”27 The Court also noted, along this line, that
“…administrative decisions are always required to consider fundamental
values.”28
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

TWU, for example.
Supra note 1, at 16-17.
Ibid at para 18.
Ibid at para 23.
Ibid at para 24 [empasis added].
Ibid at para 35.
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The Court then discussed the functional justifications for its proposed
standard. It noted that “…the fact that Charter interests are implicated
does not argue for a different standard” compared to the one imposed in
ordinary cases of disciplinary panels.29 The starting point for this argument
was “the expertise of the tribunals in connection with their home statutes.”30
So the reasoning goes, when an administrator exercises power under her
home statute, she has “by virtue of expertise and specialization, particular
familiarity with the competing considerations at play in weighing Charter
values.”31 This is the “distinct advantage that administrative bodies have
in applying the Charter to a specific set of facts and in the context of
their enabling legislation.”32 Expertise, then, played a dominant role in
justifying the reasonableness standard in these circumstances.
The Court next analyzed about how its reasonableness standard would
apply:
[55] How then does an administrative decision-maker apply Charter
values in the exercise of statutory discretion? He or she balances the
Charter values with the statutory objectives. In effecting this balancing,
the decision-maker should first consider the statutory objectives…
[56] Then the decision-maker should ask how the Charter value at issue
will best be protected in view of the statutory objectives. This is the
core of the proportionality exercise,and requires the decision-maker to
balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with
the statutory objectives.
[57] On judicial review the question becomes whether, in assessing the
impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the
decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a
proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at play.33

With this, the contours of the Doré approach are set out. Proportionality
is the core of the analysis on judicial review, but reasonableness also
features strongly in the Court’s analysis. Moreover, expertise in terms
of the facts and the law rationalizes the application of reasonableness in
this context. On this understanding, the proportionality analysis is highlyfact infused, which justifies an assumption of expertise on the part of
administrators—even if the questions at issue are constitutional in nature.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Ibid at para 45.
Ibid at para 46.
Ibid at para 47.
Ibid at para 48.
Doré, supra note 1 at paras 55-57.
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2. Vavilov
Vavilov involved a decision by the Registrar of Citizenship to revoke Mr.
Vavilov’s citizenship. Vavilov was the son of Russian spies. Generally,
under Canadian law, persons born on Canadian soil are Canadian citizens
(so-called jus soli citizenship). But under the Citizenship Act, there are
exceptions: s.3(2)(a) of the statute prescribes that jus soli citizenship
does not apply if, at the time of birth, either of Vavilov’s parents were
“a diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in
Canada of a foreign government.” Vavilov was born on Canadian soil.34
But the Registrar ultimately decided that his citizenship should be revoked,
because the status of Vavilov’s parents as spies satisfied s.3(2)(a) of the
Citizenship Act.
The Supreme Court signalled that Vavilov would be the case in which
it would revisit the standard of review analysis previously set out in
Dunsmuir.35 In so doing, the Court made multiple changes to the standard
of review analysis, both when it comes to selecting the standard of review
and applying the reasonableness standard.
On the selection of the standard of review, Vavilov retained the
presumption of deference on home statute interpretation that characterized
the post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence.36 Instead of concluding that such a
presumption was justified by, for example, the expertise of a decisionmaker, the Court instead concluded that the legislative choice to delegate
power to an administrative decision-maker is the central legal justification
for a presumption of deference.37 Expertise, on this account, is an unwieldly
functional justification:
However, if administrative decision makers are understood to possess
specialized expertise on all questions that come before them, the concept
of expertise ceases to assist a reviewing court in attempting to distinguish
questions for which applying the reasonableness standard is appropriate
from those for which it is not.38

On this account, legislative intent is the “polar star” of judicial review.39
So, while a presumption of reasonableness review is justified by legislative
intent, that presumption would need to be rebutted where a clear signal of
34. Supra note 10 at para 317.
35. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
36. Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47 at para 22;
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para
27.
37. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 26.
38. Ibid at para 28.
39. CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para 149; Ibid at para 33.
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legislative intent arises. The Court described two such situations: where
the legislature has actually legislated the standard of review, and second
where the legislature has provided for a “statutory appeal mechanism
from an administrative decision maker to a court, thereby signalling the
application of appellate standards.”40
The Court also noted that, in some situations, “respect for the rule of
law requires courts to apply the standard of correctness for certain types
of legal questions: constitutional questions, general questions of law of
central importance to the legal system as a whole and questions regarding
the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies.”41
These categories are largely retained from Dunsmuir, with the
exception of the “general questions” category, which used to include an
assessment of the expertise of the decision-maker.42 This means that for
the most part, the standard of review would be reasonableness, justified by
a presumption of legislative intent.
The Court also provided significant guidance on how to apply the
reasonableness standard of review, guidance that was sorely missing in
Dunsmuir itself. The Court started by noting that “[r]easonableness review
aims to give effect to the legislature’s intent to leave certain decisions with
an administrative body while fulfilling the constitutional role of judicial
review to ensure that exercises of state power are subject to the rule of
law.”43 In this sense, “the focus on reasonableness review must be on the
decision actually made by the decision maker, including both the decision
maker’s reasoning process and the outcome.”44 On this account, reasons
come first: a court must review the reasons as a window to the decision.45
Courts cannot use “yardsticks” to measure the appropriate outcome of the
decision; cannot conduct a de novo analysis, and cannot try to ascertain a
range of acceptable decisions.46
When conducting reasonableness review, courts are welcome to read
the reasons in light of the surrounding context, including the record and
the institutional setting.47 But this can be taken too far: “it is not ordinarily
appropriate for the reviewing court to fashion its own reasons in order to
buttress the administrative decision.”48 Cases like Alberta Teachers and
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 33.
Ibid at para 53.
Ibid at para 58.
Ibid at para 82.
Ibid at para 83.
Ibid at para 84.
Ibid at para 83.
Ibid at para 96.
Ibid.

The Conceptual Gap Between Doré and Vavilov

801

Newfoundland Nurses, which permitted such supplementation of reasons,
were distinguished by the Court.49 For that reason, it is now the case that
the relevant reasons are the ones provided by the decision-maker, not the
court.
At this point, it is sufficient to note the core themes of Vavilov. There
is a large focus on legislative intent and the institutional design choice of
legislatures to establish administrative tribunals in the first place. This focus
on legislative intent is rooted in the fact that all administrative decisionmakers are creatures of statute, created for the purpose of enacting policy.50
This focus on the legislative scheme bleeds over to the assessment of the
reasonableness of a decision, under which the governing statutory scheme
plays a leading role in constraining administrative discretion. Under this
understanding, the reasons for a decision play an important role: they
“may have implications for [an administrative decision’s] legitimacy,”51
and they “facilitate meaningful judicial review.”52 In this sense, reasons
help to ensure that courts can police the boundaries of administrative
decision-making.
II. Theory
1. Vavilov
At first blush, one can see the major differences in theoretical
underpinning between Vavilov and Doré. Vavilov, on one hand, starts with
a basically Diceyan understanding of the relationship between courts and
administrative actors, while endorsing a traditional understanding of the
relationship between the Rule of Law and legislative intent. In support of
this account, the reasons for decision play a role in ensuring that courts
can exercise their traditional functions to guarantee the legality of state
decision-making. Secondly, under Vavilov, reasons also support a “culture
of justification” in which the legitimacy of an administrative decision
depends on the reasons for it. Doré, on the other hand, is premised on a
functionalist understanding of administrative law, under which expertise is
at the forefront of the analysis, and a certain trust is placed in administrative
decision-makers to make decisions in the remit of their statutes. While
these schools of thought are not necessarily in conflict, they are distinct in
nature, leading to potentially different doctrinal applications.

49. Ibid at para 96-98.
50. Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing
Branch), 2001 SCC 52 at para 24.
51. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 81.
52. Ibid.
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a. Dicey
Vavilov is first supported by a focus on Dicey’s understanding of the
relationship between a sovereign English Parliament, the courts, and
administrative actors. Much has been written about Dicey and his
mistakes.53 It is important to assess Dicey on his own terms, and in
this sense, Dicey’s focus is on the relationship between two important
principles: parliamentary sovereignty and the Rule of Law. As it turns out,
these principles largely animate the process of selecting the standard of
review in Vavilov.
For Dicey, the Rule of Law and parliamentary sovereignty are not at
odds, and indeed, are complementary. Parliamentary sovereignty means
that Parliament can “make or unmake any law whatever.”54 Further to this
notion of parliamentary sovereignty was a restriction on other bodies in
the constitutional polity—”no person or body is recognized by the law
of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of
Parliament.”55 The only relevant limitation on parliamentary sovereignty
arises from the people themselves, “matters of political or popular
morality.”56 In this sense, for Dicey, Parliament is the supreme institution
in the British Constitution, and its law must be respected by courts.
On the other hand, the Rule of Law for Dicey means three things:

(1) “…the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power…”57
(2) “…equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes
to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law
Courts…”58
(3) “....the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries
naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but
the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced
by the Courts.”59

53. One basic strand of mistakes that plagued Dicey’s work was the limited acknowledgment of
nascent and developing administrative agencies in the UK at the time of writing. For an analysis of
this mistake and others, see, notably, the following: Harry Arthurs, “Dicey” supra note 21 at 6-7;
Matthew Lewans, “Rethinking the Diceyan Dialectic” (2008) 58:1 UTLJ 75 at 85 et seq [Lewans];
W Ivor Jennings, Book Review of A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
9th ed by ECS Wade (1940) 3 Mod L Rev 321; Paul Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United
Kingdom and the United States of America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) at 26-27.
54. Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 3.
55. Ibid at 40.
56. Lewans, supra note 53 at 82.
57. Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 120.
58. Ibid at 121.
59. Ibid.
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Of note, here, is the focus on the regular courts as the enforcers of the Rule
of Law. Indeed, it is through the judicial role that, for Dicey, parliamentary
sovereignty and the Rule of Law find harmony. It is the judiciary that is
the interpreter of law, because Parliament and other political actors are
not institutionally capable to do so.60 Given that this is the case, when
Parliament passes a law, the Rule of Law and parliamentary sovereignty
find harmony because “…from the moment Parliament has uttered its will
as lawgiver, that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon it by
the judges of the land…”61
Where does administrative law fit into this schema? Dicey’s views
cannot be described monolithically, so that broad claims that Dicey’s
theory left no place for administrative jurisdiction must be qualified.62
At first blush, Dicey was obviously hostile to administrative decisionmaking, or at least the droit administratif that characterized France. His
main argument was that the system of droit administratif was hostile to
the Rule of Law, which presupposed the independent judgment of courts
separate from government. However, Dicey’s views in this respect must be
qualified. Later in life, Dicey’s views towards droit administratif softened
considerably.63 And as a corollary to parliamentary sovereignty, Dicey
also theorized the place of so-called “subordinate” law-making bodies in
the constitutional structure.64 In other words, Dicey does recognize that
administrative jurisdiction can be parasitic on delegated parliamentary
authority, thereby accepting the ability of legislatures to delegate power.65
And a modern theory of Diceyanism must take into account the very
existence of modern administrative government to be applicable.66
In this respect, there is—at least—a second strand of Diceyanism that
might be seen as a less formal. That is, as Walters notes, private papers from
Dicey’s collection might indicate that Dicey’s theory is not as formal as so
far described.67 According to Diceyan theory, substantive and procedural
60. Ibid at 273.
61. Ibid.
62. See eg Lewans, supra note 53 at 83.
63. See AV Dicey, “Droit Administratif in Modern French Law” (1901) 17 Law Quarterly Review
302.
64. Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 16 at 41.
65. Ibid: These bodies “possess a certain legislative authority, though the authority is clearly
delegated and subject to the obvious control of a superior legislature.”
66. See for example Jeffrey Pojanowski, “Neoclassical Administrative Law” (2019) 133 Harv L
Rev 852 at 883: “Neoclassical administrative law recapitulates Dicey’s sharp distinction between rule
of law and legislative supremacy but nests it within an administrative state that serves as a deputized
lawmaker.”
67. See Mark Walters, “Legality as Reason: Dicey, Rand, and the Rule of Law” (2010) 55 McGill LJ
563 at 582-83 [Walters].
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limitations are applied by the courts on delegated actors: a decision-maker
must “conform precisely to the language of any statute by which the power
is given” and must align itself with “the spirit of judicial fairness and
equity.”68 But this “spirit of judicial fairness” might encompass an ideal
of not only “legality as order” but one of “legality as reason.”69 Indeed,
Dicey was not just concerned with law as an abstract idea, but rather noted
(variously) that the Rule of Law required a “spirit of legality,” a “legal
turn of mind” or the “spirit of law”70 These various instantiations of the
same idea, to Walters, indicates that Dicey’s theory must be connected to
a “political order.”71 That order involved one in which “[a] society that
accepts the rule of law…will always seek to justify power through legal
forms and precedents, not for the sake of formalism itself but because
consistent respect for forms and precedents is substantively “rational” and
“good.”72 As we shall see, Dicey foreshadows the connection between
formalism and justification in Vavilov.
Of course, there are problems with this understanding of the Rule
of Law and parliamentary sovereignty. For example, the special case of
privative clauses poses a significant challenge for Dicey’s harmonious
reading of the principles. So goes the challenge, “[w]hen Parliament
issues a clear directive that it wants judges to abstain from reviewing
certain administrative decisions, Dicey’s resolution is unhelpful, because
judges have to choose which constitutional principle will prevail.”73 On
this account, privative clauses demonstrate the potential incoherence of
Dicey’s dialectic; at some point, either the Rule of Law or parliamentary
sovereignty will have to give, and Dicey does not say when each should
have to relent to the other.
Nonetheless, Dicey’s descriptive analysis of English constitutional
principles came to be accepted.74 And so, in Canadian case law, the ghost
of Dicey was a common reference point for judges who came to represent
the functionalist strain of administrative law, described below.75 Yet even
68. Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 151-52.
69. See Walters, supra note 67 at 585.
70. Ibid at 583. Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 187, 199-200, 414.
71. Walters, supra note 67 at 583.
72. Ibid at 582.
73. Lewans, supra note 53 at 90.
74. AWB Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory” in AWB Simpson, ed, Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence 2d ser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 77 at 96: “Dicey announced that it was the law
that Parliament was omnicompetent, explained what this meant, and never devoted so much as a line
to fulfilling the promise he made to demonstrate that this was so. The oracle spoke, and came to be
accepted.”
75. See, for example, the opinion of Wilson J in National Corn Growers Assn v Canada (Import
Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at 1336: “Canadian courts have struggled over time to move away from
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as the Canadian law of judicial review developed, the principles of the
Rule of Law and parliamentary sovereignty continued to dominate the
analysis for determining the standard of review. This is clear in Dunsmuir.
There, the Supreme Court sought to (once again) clarify the law of judicial
review in Canada. While the particulars of the standard of review analysis
are not relevant here, the Court was anxious to solve the Diceyan dialectic,
which it called a “tension”:
Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension between the
rule of law and the foundational democratic principle, which finds an
expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create
various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers.
Courts, while exercising their constitutional functions of judicial review,
must be sensitive not only to the need to uphold the rule of law, but
also to the necessity of avoiding undue interference with the discharge
of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to
administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures.76

The purpose of the standard of review analysis, for the Dunsmuir court,
was thus to ensure the “legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the
administrative process and its outcomes”77 by determining “what authority
was intended to be given to the body in relation to the subject matter.”78
Like Dicey, the courts were the natural institutional actors to complete this
task,79 because of their constitutional role in policing the boundaries of
administrative action, by “maintaining legislative supremacy.”80
Vavilov largely picks up where Dunsmuir left off. It accepts the
continued relevance of parliamentary sovereignty and the Rule of Law,81
and particularly the role of the courts to enforce Parliament’s will.82 But
in so doing, Vavilov largely recreated Dicey’s dialectic in a number of
ways. First, accepting the continued relevance of these understandings of
the Rule of Law and parliamentary sovereignty is itself significant, and
corresponds with Dicey’s definition of the concepts. The Court, in the PanCanadian Securities Reference, confirmed that the basic Diceyan idea of
sovereignty continues to apply in Canada, even if it is qualified by the

the picture that Dicey painted toward a more sophisticated understanding of the role of administrative
tribunals in the modern Canadian state.”
76. Dunsmuir, supra note 35 at para 27.
77. Ibid at para 28.
78. Ibid at para 29.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid at para 30.
81. Supra note 10 at para 2.
82. Ibid at paras 108-110.
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idea of a written Constitution.83 And in Vavilov, the Court accepts, when
applying reasonableness review, that it is Parliament’s law that governs.
For example, as noted above, it stresses that the governing statute is “the
most salient aspect of the legal context relevant to a particular decision.”84
Indeed, administrative decision-makers cannot “disregard or rewrite the
law as enacted by Parliament and the provincial legislatures.”85 They are
nourished only by power that is specifically delegated to them: “…an
administrative body cannot exercise authority which was not delegated
to it.”86 Thus, Parliament is the master when it comes to the range of
movement that might be afforded a particular decision-maker,87 and no
decision-maker can justify a decision that misapprehends statutory limits,
as set by Parliament.88
In relation to administrative actors, this description finds perfect
harmony with Dicey’s theory. As noted above, and as Dicey argues,
administrative decision-makers are “subordinate” to a supreme
legislature.89 They are limited by the words of the statute granting them
power.90 On the Vavilovian and Diceyan account, administrative actors
possess no jurisdiction as of right, or because of specific expertise or
specialization; rather, their authority is established only by delegation.
And on the Vavilovian account, the Rule of Law is largely the rule of
courts. That is, the conception of the Rule of Law accepted by the Court
is a rather thin one, 91 focused on ensuring that Parliament’s law is adhered
to by administrative decision-makers. On this account, the goal of judicial
review is to police the boundaries of administrative decision-making
to ensure the substantive legality of administrative decisions. It merely
exists, as in Dicey’s terms, to ensure that Parliament’s will in language is
given effect, and that delegated administrative discretion is subordinated
to the law.
But more specifically, the selection of the standard of review also
brings into stark relief how the Vavilov majority reconciled the principles
of the Rule of Law and parliamentary sovereignty. In the common law
83. Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48 at paras 54, 56.
84. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 108.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid at 109.
87. Ibid at para 110.
88. Ibid.
89. Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 75.
90. See AV Dicey, “The Development of Administrative Law in England” (1915) 31 Law Q Rev 148
[Dicey, “1915”] at 151; Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 108.
91. Dicey’s description of the “thin” conception of the Rule of Law is likely one of the most famous.
For other discussions of “thin” versus “thick” conceptions of the Rule of Law, see: Brian Tamanaha,
On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 91.
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analysis, the presumption of reasonableness is “the starting point.”92 But
Parliament remains in the driver’s seat. It can specify the standard of
review through either a legislated standard of review or through a statutory
right of appeal. Both signals, for the Vavilov majority, are designed to
ensure that Parliament’s law governs.93 The fact that courts must give
effect to Parliament’s law in this sense means that, on Diceyan grounds,
courts are merely enforcing the law as written. In other cases, however,
the supremacy of the law requires that courts rebut the presumption of
reasonableness. For example, certain constitutional questions attract a
standard of correctness because they implicate the court’s role as guardian
of the Constitution and because such questions require consistent answers.
This is all a function of the Rule of Law principle, under which, in certain
cases, parliamentary will must give way to higher law, including the law
of the Constitution.
It is true that there are some differences between a Vavilovian
understanding of administrative law and Diceyanism. Dicey noted
that, at least in the English system, there was no warrant for courts to
question Parliament’s law; specifically, there was no difference between
Parliament’s law and a more “fundamental” law—such as a written
constitution—that could override it. Obviously, Dicey’s account of English
principles no longer applies to Canada, with a written Constitution. But
the difference here is not particularly difficult to adapt into the DiceyVavilov theory of administrative law. That is because Dicey’s vision of
the Rule of Law is coterminous with the so-called “supremacy of the
law.”94 Constitutionalism—that idea which holds that a Constitution is the
supreme law of the land—is but a variant of the principle of supremacy.95
As such, supremacy of the law in a system with a written Constitution
necessarily requires subordination of ordinary law to the Constitution. The
differences between the Canadian system and Dicey’s theory can therefore
be folded into a larger theory of the relationship between parliamentary
sovereignty and the Rule of Law.
But, in addition, Dicey’s blind spots track to Vavilov. Particularly,
as noted above, Dicey did not point out how parliamentary sovereignty
and the Rule of Law interact with one another in certain cases. And in
Vavilov, this is a problem. For example, it is unclear whether the principle
of legislative supremacy endorsed in Vavilov means that Parliament could
92.
93.
94.
law.
95.

Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 31.
Ibid at para 34, 36.
Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 110, equating the rule of law with the supremacy of the
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 70, 72 [QSR].
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specify the standard of review on constitutional questions. If so, it means
that that principle is supra-ordinate over the Rule of Law. But if the Rule
of Law is a standalone principle with normative force,96 then it is possible
that it could override parliamentary sovereignty, such that Parliament
could not specify the standard of review on constitutional questions. This
is a lacuna in Vavilov, and in Dicey’s theory.
These nuances, however, should not take away from the larger point.
There is much similarity between Vavilov and Dicey’s theory.
b. A culture of justification
On the other hand, Vavilov represents another school of administrative
law thought: that school seeking a “culture of justification” as a way of
justifying administrative action.
The justificatory school of administrative law thought is championed
by scholars like Dyzenhaus and Mashaw. The culture of justification, unlike
Diceyan theory, does not insist on a stringent standard of review; rather,
it accepts deference as a function of the legitimacy of the administrative
state. On this account, the reasons for the decision are the locus of the
analysis; the legitimacy of an administrative decision is not necessarily
due to the imprimatur of a court ruling, but rather to the cogency of reasons
offered in justification for a decision. Reasons play a salutary function on
this account.97
Reasons contribute to a general “culture of justification” as opposed
to a “culture of authority.” As first expounded by South African scholar
Etienne Mureinik, the culture of justification is related to democratic
norms privileging “persuasion” over “coercion.”98 Coercion, in a culture
of authority, is based “on the authority of government to exercise power.”99
In a culture of justification, the authorization to act is not the be all and end
all of the analysis. Instead, the legitimacy of administrative action depends
on its reasonableness and its cogency, in either a procedural or substantive
sense.100
The justificatory school is deeply connected to principles of democracy.
As Dyzenhaus notes:

96. As held in ibid at para 54.
97. See Jocelyn Stacey & the Hon Alice Woolley, “Can Pragmatism Function in Administrative
Law?” (2016) 74 SCLR (2d) 211 at 220.
98. See Dyzenhaus, “Justification,” supra note 18.
99. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, “Proportionality and the Culture of Justification,” (2011) 59:2
Am J Comp L 463 at 475.
100. Ibid; see also David Dyzenhaus et al, “The Principle of Legality in Administrative Law:
Internationalisation and Constitutionalisation” (2001) 1 Oxford U Commonwealth LJ 5, 29.
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The principle is inherently democratic. It adopts the assumption that
what justifies all public power is the ability of its incumbents to offer
adequate reasons for the decisions which affect those subject to them…
The legislature, the administration and the courts are then just strands
in a web of public justification…[w]hen administrative tribunals make
decisions on points of law, those subject to the decision are entitled
to require that the tribunal should offer reasons that in fact justify the
decision…..101

On this account, the virtues to be inculcated by a culture of justification
include “participation” and “accountability” as “different institutional
ways of articulating the basic principle of democracy.”102 Participation and
the quality of reasons are connected. On Dyzenhaus’ account, decisionmakers are owed deference when they reason properly, which they can
only do by “taking account of the different interests and values at stake.”103
Taking account of those interests require participation by those affected by
a decision. Reasons must be given in respect of that participation.
The culture of justification presupposes the legitimacy of the
administrative state. Justification is the way in which administrators
contribute to the legal order. Indeed, the democratic vision of the culture
of justification “builds into the idea of democracy a commitment both
to human rights and the legitimacy of the administrative state.”104 An
alternative account rooted in a more formalist understanding of the relative
capacities of administrative actors and Parliament, so goes the story, fails
to take account of the distinctive role in administrative actors in modern
government.105 Overall, by asking decision-makers to reason effectively
with respect to decisions that have a significant impact on the lives of
individuals, what one sees is a conception of democracy that is different
than the so-called Diceyan or formalist conception of parliamentary
sovereignty.106
That is not to say that, under a culture of justification, courts have no
role to play. According to Dyzenhaus, courts do have a role in enforcing
justification in the “web of public justification” which characterizes modern
government.107 This web is made up of the legislature, the administration,
101. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference,” supra note 18 at 305; see Henry S Richardson,
Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
102. Dyzenhaus, “Justification,” supra note 18 at 35.
103. David Dyzenhaus, “Dicey’s Shadow” (1993) 43:1 UTLJ 127 at 142 [Dyzenhaus, “Dicey”].
104. David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law”
(2002) 27 Queen’s LJ 445 at 451 [Dyzenhaus, “The Rule of Law”].
105. Lewans, supra note 53 at 78.
106. Dyzenhaus, “Dicey,” supra note 103 at 142.
107. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference,” supra note 18 at 305.
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and the courts, each giving effect to the definition of what constitutes
“law.” The currency is effective justification, and courts enforce the
strictures of “effective” justification through the means of judicial review.
But, necessarily, this review is based not on abstract questions of vires
or jurisdiction, but on the strength of justification offered for particular
decisions. In this sense, deference is owed when a legal determination “is
both fully reasoned and reasonable.”108
How does justification find its way into Vavilov? In many ways, it is
the centrepiece of the decision. Vavilov, if it accomplishes anything, moves
the administrative law division of labour away from selecting the standard
of review to applying the reasonableness standard of review. The decision
begins by noting that its project was to create a culture of justification
for administrative decision-making.And in this regard, Vavilov notes that
reasons “may have implications for [a decision’s] legitimacy…” as a matter
of law.109 Reasonableness review, on this account, is intimately connected
to the reasons offered for a particular decision.110 Administrative decisionmakers, through their reasons, must demonstrate that they have applied
their expertise in dealing with the matter in front of them.111 Given the
centrality of reasons, courts generally112 cannot supplement or supplant
the reasons of administrative decision-makers; allowing a court to do so
would permit a decision-maker “to abdicate its responsibility to justify to
the affected party, in a manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis
on which it arrived at a particular conclusion.”113
On this account, the reasons for decision, for the reviewing court,
provide a window into the reasonableness of a decision, facilitating proper
judicial review.114 The bottom line is that decision-makers must properly
justify decisions through cogent reasons, especially with respect to the
individuals subject to a particular decision.115

108. Dyzenhaus, “Dicey,” supra note 103 at 142.
109. Ibid at para 81.
110. Ibid at para 82-83.
111. Ibid at para 93.
112. I acknowledge some ambiguity on this point. While the Court generally rebuffs the line of cases
which permitted such supplementation in the first place, it also notes that a reviewing court might
consider the record and the history/context of proceedings in which the decision arose in order to
justify a particular decision: see Vavilov at para 94 and para 96: “Where, even if the reasons given by
an administrative decision maker for a decision are read with sensitivity to the institutional setting
and in light of the record, they contain a fundamental gap or reveal that the decision is based on an
unreasonable chain of analysis, it is not ordinarily appropriate for the reviewing court to fashion its
own reasons in order to buttress the administrative decision” [emphasis added].
113. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 96.
114. Ibid at para 81.
115. Ibid at para 95.
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c. Synthesis
At first blush, one might posit that the democratic vision of the culture
of justification is inconsistent with Diceyanism.116 Indeed, Dyzenhaus
argues that the vision of democracy put forward by those supportive of a
culture of justification is far richer than the Diceyan vision. On one hand,
the Diceyan vision depends primarily on parliamentary sovereignty. That
is, courts must authentically interpret Parliament’s will when it delegates
power, and enforce the inherent limits set out by that will on the delegate.
Dyzenhaus says this is a submission to Parliamentary will.117 On the other
hand, a culture of justification depends on a principle of “deference as
respect,” under which reasons are the means by which courts evaluate
whether deference is owed. On this account, there is a clear distinction
between Diceyan principles and the concept of a culture of justification.
Both schools, at bottom, present different visions of the Rule of Law.118
As noted above, though, Dicey could be read in multiple ways.
Walters’ description of Dicey’s account as one that is amenable to “legality
as reason” would also support the role of courts in policing the boundaries
of administrative decision-making; power must be justified to courts (and
others) in a society that values the Rule of Law. Vavilov, too, seems to
envision both schools operating in tandem. This is because the role of
reasons is designed to facilitate a court-driven concept of the Rule of
Law, under which courts police the statutory boundaries of administrative
decision-making. In this sense, decision-makers must reason with reference
to the governing statute, in order to facilitate judicial review.
Vavilov points to this synthesis in a number of areas. It first states, as
noted above, that reasons facilitate meaningful judicial review. Reasons
are directed, on the Vavilovian understanding, to the courts and affected
parties. Here, we see the bifurcated theory of Vavilov: on one hand, the
reasons are directed to the affected parties in the name of the democratic
principle of effective participation; on the other hand, reasons are means
by which the courts can review decisions. Reasons, on this account, assist
the court in policing the boundaries of administrative decision-making.
But Vavilov goes further. The Court states that reasons for decision
need to be directed to various factors in order for a decision to be
reasonable.119 For the Court, the most “salient” of these factors will be the

116. See generally David Dyzenhaus, “The Rule of Law,” supra note 104.
117. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference,” supra note 18 at 286.
118. Ibid.
119. Vavilov, supra note 10, at para 106. The Court calls these “constraints,” but what they are,
effectively, are things to which the reviewing court must turn its mind in given cases.
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governing statutory scheme under which power was delegated.120 So, on
this account, even though decision-makers contribute to elucidating the
meaning of law, they cannot disregard statutory restrictions.121 They must
reason in relation to them. But there will be a certain point at which the
statute cannot support certain forms of reasoning: “[i]t will, of course, be
impossible for an administrative decision maker to justify a decision that
strays beyond the limits set by the statutory language it is interpreting.”122
In this sense, Vavilov imposes what one might call new reasoning
requirements in relation to statutory limits.123 If it was not clear before,
decision-makers must now engage with the text, context, and purpose
of the statutes they are interpreting, under the modern approach to
interpretation,124 with only limited opportunity for error or misapprehension
of these fundamental tenets of interpretation.125 The goal of imposing these
requirements is so that the decision-maker “interpret[s] the contested
provision in a manner consistent with the text, context and purpose,”126
to authentically determine “meaning and legislative intent.”127 One might
argue that the reasoning requirements of Vavilov are deeply rooted in
discerning authentic legislative meaning; they are connected to the statute
governing the grant of decision-making authority to the administrator.
In this way, the culture of justification and Diceyanism meet, as
Dicey alluded to himself in his later work On one hand, justification is
designed to facilitate judicial review, on one account. As Dicey notes, the
Rule of Law requires a system of “ordinary courts” administering the law,
and additionally requires the subordination of delegated actors to law. It
further posits that there is no conflict between parliamentary sovereignty
and the Rule of Law because when Parliament legislates, courts enforce
Parliament’s will as set out by the words of the particular statute.128 The
reasons requirements imposed in Vavilov are designed to demonstrate that
the administrator actually justified a decision in relation to the statutory
constraints on the decision-maker. The role of the courts on review is to
determine whether the reasons adequately probed these statutory factors;
in other words, the courts enforce the Rule of Law by authentically
determining whether the administrator properly interpreted Parliament’s
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Ibid at para 108.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 110.
Ibid at paras 115-124.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 122.
Ibid at para 121.
Ibid.
Dicey, “Introduction,” supra note 17 at 273.
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will. The way in which this determination is made is through the reasons.
Thus, reasons are a means to an end for the Court; a way to not only justify
a decision to affected parties, but also a way to ensure that the Rule of Law,
as the Court understands it, is upheld.
Now, it is true that there are other ways one can interpret Vavilov,
rather than a synthesis between a culture of justification and Diceyanism.
And there are many ambiguities, even if one accepts this synthesis: for
example, put together, these schools of administrative law thought might
be marshalled to create a more stringent standard of reasonableness than
what predated Vavilov. But one could also view Vavilov as more restrained.
This question has been one that has divided commentary129 and cases130 on
the matter. Without resolving that particular conundrum,131 it is probably
fair to say that proportionality as defined in Doré and subsequent cases,
as I will note below, is more restrained than Vavilovian reasonableness.
That is, courts have historically asked administrators to do less to justify
their decisions in the Doré context than what Vavilov, at least facially,
prescribes.
In this way, Vavilov encompasses two schools of administrative law
thought that might be said to be contradictory. That said, the amalgam
reached in Vavilov is different than the theory underlying Doré.
III. Doré
1. Functionalism
On the other hand, Doré is a representative example of the school of
administrative law theory known as functionalism. While there are many
potential descriptions of functionalism, at a base level it focuses on
pragmatic reasons for favouring the exercise of administrative discretion
over intensive judicial review. It asks a basic question: “how shall the
powers of government be divided up?”132 The answer to this question,
for the functionalists, was to “assign[] the new work to the body which
experience has shown best fitted to perform work of that type.”133 For
129. See, for example, Mark Mancini, “Richardson: Rigorous Vavilov Review,” Double Aspect,
online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2020/02/05/richardson-rigorous-vavilov-review/> [https://perma.
cc/9J7V-XXKQ] and Paul Daly, “A Few Observations about Life Post-Vavilov,” Administrative Law
Matters, online: < https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/02/21/a-few-observationsabout-life-post-vavilov/> [https://perma.cc/CE5X-NEHX].
130. Compare Farrier v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 25 and Radzevicius v Workplace
Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2020 ONSC 319.
131. It is my view that saying, definitively, whether Vavilov is more “rigorous” or “restrained” will
need to be an issue worked out in the lower courts.
132. Willis, supra note 20 at 75.
133. Ibid.
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functionalists, administrative agencies met this test. Specifically, one
can say that functionalism has three strands: (1) a substantive strand,
promoting a progressive agenda with a skepticism of common law courts
and conceptual thinking (2) a focus on the expertise and efficiency of
administrative actors relative to courts in elucidating the content of the
law and (3) a skepticism of judicial review as a means of correcting
administrative decisions.
In general, functionalists were concerned about the sort of law required
for a new age, an age of social welfare rather than private individualism.
W.P.M. Kennedy, a famous functionalist, urged attention to the urgent
issues of the day as a motivator:
New standards must be developed in all fields of human endeavor which
will be in harmony with the new social philosophy of the age. Care of
the sick, the poor, the aged, and the infirm, elimination of slums, control
of industry in the interests of humanity, protection of children, universal
education, development of natural resources for the benefit of mankind,
all demand immediate attention.134

For functionalists, the answer to these new social problems required
administrative agencies. These agencies would help to deliver, efficiently
and expertly, the programs required to meet the standards of all “mankind.”
On the other hand, functionalism was beset by an intense skepticism
of courts and traditional institutional actors. J.A. Corry wrote that
Parliament and the courts were ill-suited to implementing new government
programs,135 and specifically, that courts emphasized “private right rather
than social need.”136 Relatedly, functionalists attacked the individualism
of a previous generation of scholars born and bred on Dicey. For Arthurs,
for example, Dicey “implies that judges deliberately revise the expression
of parliamentary will—a “collectivist” will—in order to preserve the
“individualist” values of the common law.”137 This, to Arthurs, was a classic
example of judicial “overreach.”138 This was because Dicey’s formulation
of the Rule of Law rendered ineffective efficient administration, a
requirement of a modern society dedicated to social welfare.139 The

134. WPM Kennedy, “Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada” (1934) 46 Jurid Rev 203 at 221
[Kennedy].
135. See Brown, supra note 21 at 55 JA Corry, “Administrative Law in Canada” (1933) Proceedings
of the Canadian Political Science Association 190 [Corry].
136. Ibid at 193.
137. Arthurs, “Dicey,” supra note 21 at 17.
138. Ibid.
139. See Arthurs, “Dicey,” supra note 21 at 22.
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common law of Dicey, in other words, produced results that “seemed
contrary to social justice…”140
On the second strand, functionalists stress the expertise of decisionmakers as a way of justifying administrative action. Harry Arthurs perhaps
best encapsulates this view in a famous article where he underscored the
importance of administrative expertise:
There is no reason to believe that a judge who reads a particular regulatory
statute once in his life, perhaps in worst-case circumstances, can read
it with greater fidelity to legislative purpose than an administrator
who is sworn to uphold that purpose, who strives to do so daily, and
is well-aware of the effect upon the purpose of the various alternative
interpretations. There is no reason to believe that a legally-trained
judge is better qualified to determine the existence or sufficiency or
appropriateness of evidence on a given point than a trained economist or
engineer, an arbitrator selected by the parties, or simply an experienced
tribunal member who decides such cases day in and day out. There
is no reason to believe that a judge whose entire professional life has
been spent dealing with disputes one by one should possess an aptitude
for issues which arise often because an administrative system dealing
with cases in volume has been designed to strike an appropriate balance
between efficiency and effective rights of participation.141

Additionally, scholars like Willis,142 Corry,143 and Kennedy,144 all
championed an expertise-based account of administrative decisionmaking that counselled deference to administrative action by courts. And
courts, prior to Vavilov, accepted the role of expertise in administrative
decision-making. In the prior “pragmatic and functional” era, courts
were concerned with relative expertise as one of the factors that guided
the selection of the standard of review. In Southam, for example, Justice
Iacobucci held that expertise was the most important factor in selecting
the standard of review.145 And in Pezim, despite the presence of a statutory
right of appeal, deference to the expertise of decision-makers was seen as
an important reason for courts to stay their hand in the standard of review
analysis.146 The doctrinal strength of expertise in this era of administrative
law is a testament to its staying power as a functional reason for deference.

140.
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Arthurs, “Woe Unto You Judges,” supra note 21 at 659.
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The third strand of functionalism is a skepticism of judicial review
as a means of error correction, and a focus on the benefits of conferring
jurisdiction on administrative decision-makers. There are two ways that
this strand can be understood. First is a legal conclusion about the role of
superior courts in the Canadian constitutional schema. On an extreme end,
scholars as eminent as Bora Laskin suggested that judicial review was not a
necessary corollary of any of Canada’s constitutional arrangements. Indeed,
Laskin argued that “there is no constitutional principle on which courts
can rest any claim to review administrative board decisions.”147 To Laskin,
the legislature had full authority to override judicial review because of the
fact that, at least at the time, judicial supremacy was not “enshrined…in
any fundamental constitutional law or in our political system.”148 Instead,
legislative supremacy, particularly in the enactment of privative clauses,
must be respected.149 Laskin’s early views were picked up by later scholars
like Harry Arthurs who suggested that the judicial jurisdiction to review
administrative decisions was not “inherent” but rather was “subject to any
contrary or limiting directions from Parliament.”150 On this account, then,
judicial review is not even a guarantee in the Canadian legal system.
Secondly, functionalism on this strand of thinking also takes issue with
judicial review as a relative matter. That is, it suggests that judicial review
is not empirically sound measure of error correction of administrative
decision-making, a view advanced by Peter Hogg:
There is nothing intrinsically good about judicial review-or indeed
any other kind of review. On the contrary, review always means that a
question decided once has to be decided again. Review is a duplication
of effort which involves extra expense and extra delay. It is not worth
bearing these costs unless there is a strong likelihood of improvement in
the quality of decision.151

This strand of functionalism questions the propriety of judicial review
as a relative means of solving administrative errors. While it does not
necessarily object to judicial review writ large in the vein advanced by
Laskin, it does suggest that judicial review is not necessarily the best
means of correcting administrative error.
These strands of functionalism all coalesce around a simple idea:
in the contest between administrative decision-makers and courts,
147. Bora Laskin, “Certiorari to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses” (1952)
30 Can Bar Rev 989
148. Ibid at 990.
149. Ibid.
150. Arthurs, “Protection,” supra note 21 at 278.
151. Hogg, supra note 21 at 338.

The Conceptual Gap Between Doré and Vavilov

817

administrative decision-makers are legally and functionally better suited
to decide certain matters. On this account, courts have a limited role to
play, if any at all. Instead, the functional reasons guiding delegation to
administrative decision-makers are dominant: their supposed expertise,
efficiency, and specialization.
Where does this leave Doré? Doré does not envision the stronger
functionalist strain—the one that questions whether judicial review is a
constitutional good at all. Indeed, this would be a hard case to make on
constitutional matters. Doré merely applies a reasonableness standard
of review to constitutional questions arising within the remit of the
decision-maker. But the reasons why Doré does so are squarely within the
functionalist strain, particularly as it applies to relative expertise and the
role of the courts. Recall that Doré insists that “[t]he notion of deference”
should not stand in the way of conducting rigorous judicial review of
constitutional issues.152 That notion of deference, as Justice Abella notes,
is justified by the expertise of decision-makers: “[t]he starting point is
the expertise of the tribunals in connection with their home statutes.”153
For Justice Abella, citing John Evans, expertise does not lose its force
specifically because an issue has a constitutional dimension.154 As such, it
would constitute the amateur overturning the expert155 if courts applied a
more searching review simply because an issue was constitutional.156
With expertise as the lynchpin of the Doré approach, there is a
concomitant fear of courts overreaching, and a desire for a legitimate place
for administrators in the overall legal scheme. Setting up the Doré approach
was, in Justice Abella’s view, a different relationship between courts
and administrative actors in the Court’s jurisprudence.157 That revised
relationship, brought forward by Dunsmuir, was guided by a “policy of
deference” that is rooted in legislative intent and expertise.158 The approach
set out in Doré emphasizes that expert administrators should have a role
in elucidating the content of constitutional protections in the context of
their enabling statutes.159 This, to Justice Abella, citing Mary Liston,
opens “an institutional dialogue about the appropriate use and control of

152. Supra note 1 at para 5.
153. Ibid at para 46.
154. Ibid; see John Evans, “Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?”
(2004) 17 CJALP 59 at 93).
155. Willis, supra note 20 at 79.
156. See Doré, supra note 1 at para 54.
157. Ibid at para 30.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid at para 35.
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discretion, rather than the older command-and-control relationship.”160
What is envisioned is a decided break from Diceyan thinking, towards a
world in which administrators have something valuable to say about the
Constitution because of their particular institutional expertise.
In Doré, then, one sees how functionalism comes to the fore. The
justification for deference—even on constitutional matters—is rooted in
the natural expertise and field sensitivity of decision-makers in managing
their statutes. But, additionally, there is an implicit worry that generalist
courts will unduly interfere with the workings of these statutes, in the
name of a specious constitutional claim.161 The presence of a constitutional
claim, on this account, should not transform the respect courts have for
the distinct capacity of administrative actors to contribute to the content
of the law. So, one sees the respect for expertise of administrators in Doré
in the act of elucidating the law of the Constitution. This a fundamentally
functionalist understanding of administrative law.
2. Comparison
The marriage in Vavilov between Diceyanism and a culture of justification,
and Doré’s functionalism, present an opportunity to demonstrate how
these theories differ in the doctrine presented in these cases. Indeed, while
the theories may in some senses be complementary,162 there are distinct
differences between them. And in the context of Doré and Vavilov, these
differences turn out to be quite significant—and call into question whether
Doré can stand by in a Vavilovian world, as a matter of doctrine.
First, a disclaimer: as noted above, these theories are not watertight
compartments that prescribe certain doctrinal answers in every case. Put
differently, there are some ways in which Diceyanism, functionalism, and
the justificatory school are fundamentally similar. There are a few examples
of this. First, functionalism and the justificatory school both envision
administrators as contributing to the enterprise of legal development. On
this account, the rule of law is not the rule of courts. It is rather the rule of
both courts and administrators (and legislatures), contributing to the act of
160. Ibid; citing Mary Liston, “Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative
State” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2008) at 77.
161. Doré, supra note 1 at para 52: “So our choice is between saying that every time a party argues
that Charter values are implicated on judicial review, a reasonableness review is transformed into
a correctness one, or saying that while both tribunals and courts can interpret the Charter, the
administrative decision-maker has the necessary specialized expertise and discretionary power in the
area where the Charter values are being balanced.”
162. See for example, G Blaine Baker, “Willis on ‘Cultured’ Public Authorities” (2005) 55:3 UTLJ
335-336, where the author explores how Willis thought that the internal cultures of administrative
agencies made them well-suited to public deliberations about the law.
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law-making.163 And, in terms of other similarities, the justificatory school
and functionalism envision a different role for courts: a role in which
courts treat decision-makers with respect, rather than suspicion, as under
the Diceyan model. And even Diceyanism and functionalism have some
similarities. Both are rooted in a respect for Parliament’s wish to delegate
power. While Diceyanism may view delegation with more suspicion than
functionalism, this is a matter of degree: Diceyans still must recognize
that, if parliamentary sovereignty is real, so is Parliament’s desire to
delegate power to other actors, as a matter of empirical fact in the modern
administrative state.
But this is largely where the similarities end. If one compares Vavilov
and Doré on their own terms, one sees the doctrinal differences flowing
from theoretical differences in these cases.
Take first the topic of expertise, and its role in selecting the standard
of review. In Doré, as for the functionalist, expertise is the lynchpin of
judicial review. It is largely because of the expertise of decision-makers
that deference accrues to them. Indeed, it is expertise even on constitutional
matters that justifies the selection of a reasonableness standard when
decision-makers must balance Charter values arising in their mandate.
Note, as well, how expertise is used in Doré: it is assumed by the Court in
selecting a reasonableness standard, but it is not required that a decisionmaker actually demonstrate their relative expertise through reasons.
But Vavilov presents a different story. Vavilov resiles from expertise
as a reason for deference in terms of selecting a standard of review. Now,
expertise is not a reason for deference;164 expertise comes into play only in
the justification stage of the analysis, where reasons can evince expertise to
which courts should pay attention.165 But it is not expertise that is the driver
of deference on a wholesale basis. Such an understanding of expertise is
justified by the marriage between Diceyanism and the justificatory school.
On the Diceyan side, as mentioned above, no administrator can arrogate to
themselves power that was not assigned to them by Parliament; and courts,
therefore, cannot grant more deference to an administrative decisionmaker simply on the basis of assumed expertise. And on the justificatory
side, deference is not a submissive concept; instead, it is based on whether
a decision-maker has made a fully reasoned and reasonable decision.166

163.
164.
165.
166.

Kevin Stack, “Overcoming Dicey in Administrative Law” (2018) 68 UTLJ 293.
Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 31.
Ibid at para 119.
Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference,” supra note 18 at 305.
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Expertise is not a reflexive reason for deference on this account. And so,
one sees Vavilov and Doré differing fundamentally on this doctrinal point.
Vavilov also differs from Doré in another fundamental respect. The
role of the courts envisioned in both Doré and Vavilov are fundamentally
different, especially when it comes to constitutional matters and the
standard of review. It is true that Vavilov expressly withdraws Doré from
its revisions to the standard of review, but the comments made in Vavilov
regarding the role of the courts on constitutional issues are stark, indeed. As
noted above, the Court largely aligns itself with a Diceyan understanding
of the courts when it speaks of constitutional issues. It starts by saying,
generally, that the Rule of Law will sometimes require the court to
“provide the last word” where it also requires “consistency and for which
a final and determinate answer is necessary.”167 In such cases, discord
among administrative actors cannot be tolerated because of what Dicey
would call the supremacy of the law. Specific among these cases are those
raising constitutional questions. It is worthwhile to quote extensively from
what the Court said about its understanding of the relationship between
administrative actors, legislatures, and courts:
The Constitution—both written and unwritten—dictates the limits of all
state action. Legislatures and administrative decision makers are bound
by the Constitution and must comply with it. A legislature cannot alter
the scope of its own constitutional powers through statute. Nor can it
alter the constitutional limits of executive power by delegating authority
to an administrative body. In other words, although a legislature may
choose what powers it delegates to an administrative body, it cannot
delegate powers that it does not constitutionally have. The constitutional
authority to act must have determinate, defined and consistent limits,
which necessitates the application of the correctness standard.168

This is a rather muscular conception of the role of the courts under the
Rule of Law, which finds accord with Dicey’s Rule of Law. On this
account, administrators are granted the powers they have only by statute,
and cannot alter the constitutional scope of those powers. It is the role of
the court to ensure that, when administrators interpret the Constitution,
they do so in concert with its limits. While, as noted above, Vavilov does
not include Doré in these comments, it is hard to distinguish the areas
in which these comments apply (scope of Aboriginal rights, division of
powers, etc) from the context in which Doré -type claims arise.

167. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 53.
168. Ibid at para 56.
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But Doré obviously takes a different approach to constitutional
questions. Inspired by the functionalist strain of analysis, Doré does not
concern itself with the traditional roles of legislatures and courts, as Vavilov
does. Rather, it rests its selection of a reasonableness standard on the
expertise of particular decision-makers. But this is a different theoretical
basis than Vavilov. Under Vavilov, correctness is selected because the
courts are required to ensure stability in the law on constitutional questions.
Under Doré, such stability is undermined because multiple administrative
actors could have multiple things to say about particular constitutional
guarantees on the face of their enabling statutes. Such a state of affairs
seems contradictory to Vavilov’s clear language.
Secondly, one might argue that Vavilov overtakes Doré.169 This view
is advanced by Professor Daly, who argues that Doré actually “emerges
strengthened” after Vavilov.170 The argument goes like this: the Vavilov
reasonableness presumption applies to all issues going to the “merits.”171
Doré-type questions are part of the merits. Therefore, on this line of
thought, the Vavilov presumption applies to Doré-type issues.
Despite the neatness of the logic in this argument, in my view, it runs
up against important constitutional principles. Recall that Vavilov roots
the presumption of reasonableness on the basis of legislative intent.172 It is
the very fact of legislative delegation that legitimizes the presumption of
reasonableness.
This presumption requires a leap in logic (ie) it is not obvious that
reasonableness should follow simply because a matter is delegated to an
administrative decision-maker. However, to expand the Vavilov presumption
to encompass Doré-type questions—constitutional questions—turns
constitutional principles on their head. This is because a legislature cannot
do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Specifically, the legislature cannot,
itself, dictate the intensity of scrutiny applied to its own enactments by
courts.173 When it comes to statutes and the standard of review, Vavilov
confirms that legislatures can only specify the standard of review within the
169. I also deal with this argument in similar terms in Mark Mancini, “Vavilov’s Rule of Law: A
Diceyan Model and its Implications,” CJALP (forthcoming).
170. Paul Daly, “Unresolved Issues after Vavilov II: The Doré Framework” Administrative Law
Matters, online, <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/05/06/unresolved-issuesafter-vavilov-ii-the-dore-framework/> [https://perma.cc/FK6G-HTPQ].
171. Ibid; Vavilov, supra note 10, at para 23.
172. Supra note 10 at para 30.
173. See Amax Potash Ltd Etc v The Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 SCR 576 at 591:
legislatures do not have the ability to “limit judicial review of constitutionality.” See also Mark Mancini,
“Doré Revisited: A Response to Professor Daly,” online, Double Aspect <https://doubleaspect.
blog/2020/05/21/Doré-revisited-a-response-to-professor-daly/> [https://perma.cc/NKN3-NKPP].
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limits imposed by the Rule of Law, a constitutional principle.174 Applying
this line of thought to administrative actors, the legislature should not be
able to specify a deferential standard on constitutional matters if it cannot
do so with regards to its own legislation. This would convert the tool of
delegation into a way for legislatures to escape constitutional scrutiny.
For this constitutional reason, the Vavilov presumption cannot apply to
Doré-type questions. Doré, in this way, cannot be said to have emerged
strengthened from Vavilov.
When presented in this fashion, Vavilov tends to present a more
“centralist” version of administrative law than Doré’s “pluralist” version.175
On the centralist understanding, the courts are largely the guardians of
the Constitution, and should intervene freely to ensure that constitutional
guarantees are interpreted equally across the board. Correctness review,
at least in theory, guarantees this stability. But on a reasonableness
standard, as endorsed in Doré, the legal system could tolerate “multiple
reasonable interpretations” of constitutional guarantees, which take the
flavour of the particular statutory objectives that are at play. This could be
seen as a contradiction in doctrinal terms between the two cases.Finally,
putting aside the selection of the standard of review, there are theoretical
strains between Vavilov’s justification requirements and Doré. Without
determining whether Vavilov is more rigorous than Dunsmuir, it is probably
fair to say that Vavilovian reasonableness review will be more stringent
than Doré reasonableness/proportionality review. As noted above, in
Vavilov, the Court endorsed a culture of justification as defining, in part,
what administrators must do to make their decisions reasonable. Reasons
are the centerpiece of the analysis, the coin in which administrators buy
deference from the courts. A decision, in order to be reasonable, must not
only be justified in result, but supported by cogent reasons that engage
with a number of key factors, most notably the enabling statute.
But on the other hand, Doré mentions no requirements of
reasonableness in the constitutional context. While Doré makes much of
an equity between reasonableness and proportionality,176 arguing that the
approach it adopted works the same “justificatory muscles” as the Oakes
test,177 that equity has often amounted to little more than judicial rubberstamping. Indeed, in Trinity Western, the majority noted that all that was
required from the Law Society in that case was that it was “alive” to the
174. Supra note 10, at para 35.
175. Harry Arthurs, “Without the Law”: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in NineteenthCentury England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 1-12.
176. Supra note 1 at para 7.
177. Ibid at para 5.
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Charter issues.178 There was little in the way of reasoning requirements in
terms of constitutional interpretive methodology, or other requirements for
reasons. Even though TWU involved a law society, typically not subject
to stringent reasoning requirements, there was no requirement at all for
explicitly reasoned decision-making from the Law Society. The dissent
took the majority to task for this test:
While the Benchers may not have had a duty to provide formal reasons
(Majority Reasons, at para. 55), the rationale for deference under Doré—
expertise in applying the Charter to a specific set of facts (paras. 47-48)—
requires more engagement and consideration from an administrative
decision-maker than simply being “alive to the issues”, whatever that
may mean (Majority Reasons, at para. 56).179

Contrast this state of affairs with Vavilov, which incorporates aspects of
interpretive methodology, and imposes those requirements on decisionmakers. More specifically, Vavilov asks decision-makers to ensure that
their decisions comport with the text, context, and purpose of the statute
they are interpreting. This bears a remarkable difference from Doré and
TWU, which import no such requirements when decision-makers engage
in constitutional reasoning.
These are the main pressure points in the relationship between
Vavilov and Doré. On one understanding, Vavilov tends to revert to a
Diceyan understanding of administrative law, under which courts reserve
to themselves the final say on certain issues. It also shows a focus on
justification, as a doctrinal requirement in most cases. However, Doré
is rooted in a more functionalist understanding of administrative law,
under which expertise is taken as a given and administrators are seen as
competent to contribute to the content of the law. These differences in
theory lead to direct doctrinal differences.
IV. Saving Doré?
Given the opposition in theory between Doré and Vavilov, the question
remains: can Doré stand as a doctrinal matter? In my view, it can only do so
with significant amendment to its fundamental doctrinal precepts. Here, I
outline the benefits and drawbacks to various approaches to synchronizing
Doré and Vavilov.
Before turning to this issue, there is a question that should be
addressed: should the courts even attempt to reconcile differences between
these doctrines? In other words, why is it necessary for doctrine to be
178. Supra note 8 at paras 55-56.
179. Ibid at para 294.
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consistent in these different contexts? While Doré raises constitutional
issues, and Vavilov does not, the same fundamental problem arises: the
powers of administrative actors and the amount of scrutiny they should
receive. The specific question is whether and how deference should apply
in constitutional cases in comparison to cases involving ordinary questions
of law. Put differently, if Vavilov insists on a rather formalist approach for
ordinary questions of law, what compelling reason is there not to import
parts of this approach for constitutional matters? In this sense, and in the
name of consistent doctrine, courts should try to treat these areas the same,
while being alive to particularly different, nuanced applications of the
doctrine in particular cases.
1. Bifurcation
One possible remedy to the problem of the schism between Doré and
Vavilov asks courts to bifurcate the standard of review analysis. So this
argument generally goes, courts will apply a correctness standard to the
question of whether to consider constitutional rights at all. This is a legal
question, which is a matter of statutory analysis: does the statute permit
discretion to consider Charter rights or values? In turn, decision-makers
will apply a reasonableness standard to the application of constitutional
rights to the facts (say, in a proportionality analysis) if constitutional rights
need to be considered.
This approach has a number of benefits. It, at least facially, reconciles the
Court’s comments in Vavilov with Doré. That is, it retains a superintending
power for the courts on questions of the existence of constitutional rights,
but it makes the case for Doré’s reliance on expertise much stronger.
While it may be true that administrative actors do not have expertise on
deciding on the scope or relevance of constitutional values, once those
values are ascertained, their application to the facts or in relation to
statutory objectives might be an issue over which administrators are more
likely to have expertise. Put differently, this approach leaves the courts in
a “best of both worlds” situation. On one hand, the court retains the core
power of judicial review over constitutional protections but leaves factual
inferences to be drawn from those protections to expert administrators.
This straddles the Diceyan and functionalist worlds in a way that might be
thought to be defensible.
Additionally, bifurcation is supported by precedent. This was the
approach adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in a post-Vavilov
decision, Ferrier.180 Ferrier involved the Police Services Act. Under the
180. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Ferrier, 2019 ONCA 1025 [Ferrier].
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Police Services Act, subject to certain exceptions, police hearings are
“open to the public.”181 In other words, a provision of the statute (s 35(4))
sets out the test for whether a hearing should be closed. In this case, the
relevant decision-maker decided that the hearing should be closed. The
CBC and others argued that the decision-maker “failed to pay adequate
attention to the s. 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression by failing
to require an open hearing.”182 Specifically, the applicants argued that the
so-called Dagenais/Mentuck 183 test applied to the case: “[t]his test applies
to discretionary decisions limiting freedom of the press in relation to court
proceedings.”184 The decision-maker, though, rejected the application
of this test because (1) Dagenais/Mentuck apparently only applies to
situations in the courtroom and (2) the relevant statute prescribed the
proper test for determining whether to hold a closed hearing, and that
statutory test ousted the consideration of Dagenais/Mentuck.
In determining the standard of review, the Court was in an awkward
position because “[t]his appeal had been argued and a complete draft of
these reasons had been written before the Supreme Court released its
decision in [Vavilov].”185 Nonetheless, the Court went on to assess the
standard of review under the Vavilov framework. Relying on both the
“central questions” and constitutional questions correctness categories
from Vavilov, Sharpe JA noted that “the attack on the decision focussed
on the refusal to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test when concluding that
the extension hearing should be closed.”186 This, to the Court, “should”
be reviewable on a correctness standard.187 To Sharpe JA, “[t]he s.2(b)
Charter right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press relied
upon by the appellants is both a matter of central importance to the legal
system and a constitutional question.”188 This was because, as confirmed by
Vavilov, correctness review “…respects the unique role of the judiciary in
interpreting the Constitution and ensures that courts are able to provide the
last word on questions for which the rule of law requires consistency and
for which a final and determinate answer is necessary.”189 In this situation,
correctness review was appropriate because the decision of whether the
181. Police Services Act, s.35(3)-(4).
182. Ferrier, supra note 179 at para 4.
183. From the cases Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835; R v Mentuck, 2001
SCC 76.
184. Ferrier, supra note 180 at para 15.
185. Ibid at para 29.
186. Ferrier, supra note 180 at para 32.
187. Ibid at para 35.
188. Ibid at para 36.
189. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 53; Ferrier, supra note 180 at para 36.
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Dagenais/Mentuck test applied was different from the issue faced in Doré,
which was how the s.2(b) right implicated the discretionary decision.190
Such situations would be subject to reasonableness review.
Bifurcation is also the modus operandi in cases involving the duty to
consult with Indigenous peoples. Professor Daly argues, in this context, that
“there is nothing novel in treating threshold questions of constitutionality
as requiring correctness review.”191 And he marshals two examples to
prove his point: Haida Nation192 and Rio Tinto,193 in the context of the
Aboriginal duty to consult, and Ktunaxa,194 which was in essence a Doré
case.
Haida Nation was, at least in the duty to consult context, the seminal
statement on the standard of review. It said the following about how courts
should review the assessment of the duty to consult by a “decision-maker”:
On questions of law, a decision-maker must generally be correct: for
example, Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003]
2 S.C.R. 585, 2003 SCC 55. On questions of fact or mixed fact and law,
on the other hand, a reviewing body may owe a degree of deference
to the decision-maker. The existence or extent of the duty to consult
or accommodate is a legal question in the sense that it defines a legal
duty. However, it is typically premised on an assessment of the facts.
It follows that a degree of deference to the findings of fact of the initial
adjudicator may be appropriate. The need for deference and its degree
will depend on the nature of the question the tribunal was addressing and
the extent to which the facts were within the expertise of the tribunal:
Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC
20; Paul, supra. Absent error on legal issues, the tribunal may be in a
better position to evaluate the issue than the reviewing court, and some
degree of deference may be required. In such a case, the standard of
review is likely to be reasonableness. To the extent that the issue is one
of pure law, and can be isolated from the issues of fact, the standard
is correctness. However, where the two are inextricably entwined, the
standard will likely be reasonableness: Canada (Director of Investigation
and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748.195

Haida Nation thus, at least in one sense, endorses bifurcation. It suggests
that extricable legal questions could be reviewed on a correctness standard
190. Ferrier, supra note 180 at para 37.
191. Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative Law” (January
15, 2020) Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2020-09. Available online: SSRN: <https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3519681> at 31.
192. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 [Rio Tinto].
193. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 [Haida Nation].
194. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017
SCC 54.
195. Haida Nation, supra note 193 at para 61.
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(the “existence” of the duty to consult falls in this category). But, on the
other hand, it suggests that factual questions are subject to a “degree of
deference.”
Rio Tinto solidifies the point when it comes to administrative tribunals
and their handling of the duty to consult. The Court starts by noting that
“[t]he duty on a tribunal to consider consultation and the scope of that
inquiry depends on the mandate conferred by the legislation that creates
the tribunal.”196 The question, then, is fundamentally one of legislative
interpretation. But, despite this, and notwithstanding the general standard
of reasonableness that applied to such questions under Dunsmuir, the
Court in Rio Tinto concludes that:
The first question is whether consideration of the duty to consult was
within the mandate of the Commission. This being an issue of jurisdiction,
the standard of review at common law is correctness. The relevant
statutes, discussed earlier, do not displace that standard. I therefore agree
with the Court of Appeal that the Commission did not err in concluding
that it had the power to consider the issue of consultation.197

Rio Tinto, then, confirms Haida Nation and the idea that at least in the
duty to consult context, bifurcating the standard of review is a regular,
uncontroversial practice.
In principle and in precedent, then, bifurcation appears to be a sound
way to bridge the conceptual gap between Doré and Vavilov. But there are
problems with bifurcation as a doctrinal approach. First, bifurcation seems
inconsistent with the approach in Doré. As noted above, Doré approaches
a unified public law in which the difference between constitutional and
administrative review is “not as stark.”198 In a unified public law:
…the licence to interpret and implement constitutional values extends
to administrative officials, which entails that judges should respect
administrative decisions concerning constitutional matters provided that
they are rendered in a fair, transparent, and reasonably justified manner.199

Doré largely incorporates this public law theory, bolstered with
functionalist credentials. By articulating the expertise of administrative
decision-makers, Doré implicitly holds that these decision-makers can
contribute to the meaning of the law, including the Constitution,200 even
196. Rio Tinto, supra note 192 at 55.
197. Ibid at para 67.
198. See Paul Daly, “The Court and Administrative Law: Models of Rights Protection” (2017) 78
SCLR at 75.
199. Lewans, “Unity,” supra note 6 at 518-519.
200. Mark Mancini, “Trinity Western: Is this the price of good doctrine?” online: Double Aspect
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though it does not impose explicit reasoning requirements on decisionmakers. So goes this argument, a unified standard of deferential review
should apply to decisions of administrators, who contribute to the shared
enterprise of law-making in modern day Canada. The reasonableness
standard on constitutional matters broadly construed achieves this goal
by respecting the role of administrative decision-makers in contributing
to the law.
Bifurcation upsets this unity. By extricating questions of law that are
said to be above and beyond the remit of administrators, courts undermine
the message of Doré: that administrators can contribute to shared
constitutional meaning. Put differently, bifurcation says that the expertise
of administrative decision-makers does not extend to the recognition of
Charter values in the context of their statutory schemes. The approach is
premised on an old distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact: the former is the preserve of the courts. Doré, and the unity of public
law thesis, are designed to break down these old barriers in favour of a
new approach that recognizes the legitimate jurisdiction of administrative
decision-makers.
Secondly, even if one does not accept Doré’s line of analysis on this
question, bifurcation arguably does not go far enough on one interpretation
of Vavilov’s own terms. That is, if one takes the strongest possible reading
of Vavilov as requiring constitutional consistency across statutory contexts,
then there is a chance that even the Doré proportionality analysis should
fall to be reviewed on a correctness standard.
This is true on both sides of the bifurcated analysis. First, the decision
whether a statute ousts Charter values arguably falls within a strong
interpretation of Vavilov’s comments about the Rule of Law. When a
decision-maker decides that a statute ousts discretion, as in Ferrier, and
the Charter therefore does not apply, the decision-maker is effectively
short-circuiting a potentially meritorious constitutional claim before it
begins. This is a decision which has far-reaching effects beyond the statute
or the case before the decision-maker; it goes, in the abstract, to the reach
and force of the Charter. This is, at least arguably, a situation that engages
the unique role of the courts in interpreting the Constitution, as confirmed
by Vavilov.
<https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/07/17/trinity-western-is-this-the-price-of-good-doctrine/>
[https://perma.cc/FFK9-DN6C]: “In effect, the Court merged administrative and constitutional
review”; Matthew Lewans, “Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter” (2013)
23:2 Constitutional Forum at 19: arguing that Doré, as part of a larger move away from “formal
constitutionalism,” blurred the lines between legislative, adjudicative, and administrative functions,
permitting “administrative officials [to] share responsibility for interpreting the law.”
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Now turn to the proportionality side of the equation. Doré proceeds
on the assumption that, because the proportionality analysis is rooted in
the facts of particular cases, the decision-maker has expertise in applying
constitutional values to those facts.201 But there are three related reasons
why Doré’s proportionality analysis could be a legal question of general
importance or a constitutional question on a strong interpretation of
Vavilov’s terms. First, while proportionality analysis purports to be
about the particular exercise of discretion on particular facts, there is
the fundamental question of whether Charter rights were adequately
weighed in the balance with statutory objectives. This question, again,
goes to the scope and application of the Charter, which itself could be a
question that transcends any particular statutory arrangement, on Vavilov’s
terms. Second, the role of the courts as unique constitutional interpreters
would be undermined if they could not ensure the consistent application
of constitutional law across all instances of discretionary actors. While
reasonableness review is still review, there is the possibility that there
could be multiple reasonable exercises of discretion when it comes to
constitutional values. But this undermines the uniformity required by the
Rule of Law, on Vavilov’s own terms. Finally, another issue is consistency:
having to do with the difference between sorts of review in discretionary
and statutory contexts. There is no doubt that the correctness standard
applies when a statute is attacked as inconsistent with the Constitution.
But Doré takes a different turn, applying a reasonableness standard in the
proportionality analysis. The very act of applying deference in the context
of proportionality means that the consistency required by the Rule of
Law is undermined; based on whether a statute is attacked or an act of
discretion is attacked, under Doré, constitutional rights mean something
different.202 This has been described as arbitrary,203 and seems inconsistent
with Vavilov’s focus on stability when it comes to constitutional questions.
But the point is not that any one argument is decisive: it is that there is
a potential for conflict. Taken together, bifurcation presents problems from
both the Doré and Vavilov perspectives. On the Doré perspective, it fails to
respect the unity of public law thesis that defines the case. On the Vavilov
201. Supra note 1 at para 46, 54.
202. See also Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross
Fertilization or Inconstancy?” in Lorne Sossin & Colleen Flood, eds, Administrative Law in Context
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2012) at 431: the correct reading of Doré is that express authority
to infringe a Charter right requires the Oakes analysis, but imprecise authority does not, one can
legitimately question why, when the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, there would be two
different approaches to determining the constitutionality of government action depending on whether
it is expressly authorized by legislation or not.”
203. See Ponomarenko, supra note 9 at 127.
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perspective, Vavilov could be said to strengthen the meaning of the Rule of
Law in terms of the role of the courts on constitutional questions. On that
front, it could be inconsistent with either Doré or Vavilov.
2. Stricter reasonableness review
One additional move that could be made to synthesize Doré with Vavilov
might involve adopting the reasonableness standard from Vavilov into the
Doré context. Stronger reasonableness review on constitutional matters
might bolster the justificatory credentials of Doré, bringing it closer in line
with Vavilov.
The approach might be based on Vavilov’s contribution to a “culture
of justification.” Specifically, the Court notes that “[w]here the impact of
a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons
provided to that individual must reflect the stakes.”204 Particularly, where
a decision has consequences that are harsh, decision-makers will be asked
to grapple with those consequences.205 Where constitutional rights are at
stake, there is good reason to worry about the consequences on individuals.
Constitutional cases often involve highly important rights and interests
that could clearly encompass life and death issues, as contemplated in
Vavilov.206
What would this approach entail? Recall that Vavilov, in the context
of legislative interpretation by administrators, asked decision-makers
to focus on a number of “constraints” that would determine whether
a particular decision is reasonable or not. Some of these constraints
are particularly relevant to the constitutional context. For example,
in the context of assessing the reasonableness of a decisionmaker’s
constitutional conclusions, Vavilov’s focus on the “governing statutory
scheme” could easily simply be rebranded as the governing constitutional
text; precedent, in both contexts, would be relevant; and the principles of
statutory interpretation emphasized in Vavilov could become the principles
of constitutional interpretation in the Doré context. Additionally, the Court
could impose explicit reasoning requirements on all of these constraints;
where they are in play, decision-makers should reason in relation to them,
just as the Court asked decision-makers to reason respecting the Vavilov
constraints.
Reasoning about constitutional rights in this way would require more
than what Doré currently prescribes. That is, decision-makers may need
to engage with the constitutional text more explicitly. This means that the
204. Vavilov, supra note 10 at para 133.
205. Ibid.
206. Ibid.
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approach focusing on Charter values is somewhat beside the real point
of inquiry: to determine what the Constitution itself prescribes in terms
of “space” for the decision-maker to maneuver. In this sense, decisionmakers will also be asked to engage with the “purposive approach” to
constitutional interpretation, the leading interpretive approach at the
Supreme Court.207 Decision-makers, in their reasons, would need to
explicitly engage with the text in its “proper linguistic, philosophic and
historical contexts.”208 There could be room for minor omissions in the
context of this reasoning,209 but in general, as in the statutory context,
decision-makers will be asked to engage with the most salient and material
aspects of the interpretive context.
In my view, this approach could be beneficial in bridging the gap between
Vavilov and Doré. On one hand, asking administrators to reason explicitly
about the Constitution arguably brings Doré closer to the justificatory
roots of Vavilov. If reasons are the coin in which administrative decisions
purchase their legitimacy, then the same should apply in the context of
the Constitution; perhaps, actually, the case is stronger, given the stakes
to the individual claimants. Additionally, asking decision-makers to deal
with the actual text of the Constitution in its interpretive context arguably
brings Doré into a tighter relationship with more traditional, formal legal
materials. While it would be odd to say that such a move brings Doré
closer to the world of Dicey, this approach does focus attention on the text
of the Constitution, in a way that Doré previously did not.
However, there are problems with this approach. First, this approach
says nothing about the selection of the relevant standard of review.
Assuming there is a difference when courts apply a reasonableness
standard over the correctness standard, this matters. As the Court in
Vavilov notes, correctness review has a substantive element: it guards the
role of the courts in enforcing the strictures of constitutional law. 210 This
role of the courts is one that the Supreme Court appears to treasure in its
precedents.211 Yet simply focusing on reasonableness review as a way to
bridge the conceptual gap between Doré and Vavilov ignores this important
role of the courts, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada.
207. See, most recently, R v Poulin, 2019 SCC 47. But by no means is this the only interpretive
approach: see Leonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional
Jurisprudence” (2017) 50:2 UBC L Rev 505.
208. R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 117.
209. Vavilov, supra note 10 at 122.
210. Ibid at para 53.
211. Hunter et al v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 155; Ell v Alberta, 2003 SCC 35 at para 23;
United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7 at para 35; Kourtessis v MNR, [1993] 2 SCR 53 at 90; Reference
re Supreme Court Act, ss 5-6, 2014 SCC 21 at para 89.
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But also, this approach might be seen to undermine Doré, as well.
If Doré accomplished anything, it was the “democrati[zation]” of
administrative decision-making.212 That is, “it gives non-lawyers the
ability to produce binding interpretations of constitutional law (within the
bounds of reasonableness/proportionality).”213 Under the Doré approach,
where decision-makers balance Charter values with statutory objectives,
decision-makers are not asked to deploy onerous legalistic tools, as Paul
Daly notes:
This approach recognizes that it would be unrealistic and inappropriate to
require administrative decision-makers to have Professor Hogg’s looseleaf Constitutional Law of Canada text to hand whenever they encounter
a human rights issue and Ruth Sullivan’s text on the interpretation of
statutes on the shelf in case a knotty interpretive problem arises in the
course of their work. It deformalizes the process of decision-making by
front-line officials. Rather than the Charter, they are directed towards
Charter values; rather than statutory text, they are directed towards
statutory objectives. And they are directed to balance Charter values
against statutory objectives, having regard to “the specific facts of the
case.”214

Doré, then, is based on an approach to decision-making that is far more
informal than the proposed approach to constitutional questions advanced
herein. It even appears more informal than Vavilov. While Vavilov does
say that “[a]dministrative decision makers are not required to engage in
a formalistic statutory interpretation exercise in every case”215 it also says
that “the merits of an administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of a
statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and purpose
of the provision.”216 On this front, the principles of statutory interpretation
“apply equally when an administrative decision maker interprets a
provision.”217 Imposing such constitutional interpretive principles on
decision-makers tends to undermine the overall logic of Doré, which is
designed to informalize the process of constitutional interpretation.

212. See Paul Daly, “A Week of Arguments About Deference,” Administrative Law Matters,
online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/06/18/a-week-of-arguments-aboutdeference/> [https://perma.cc/LZR9-MX8L].
213. Ibid.
214. See Paul Daly, “Human Rights in Administrative Decision-Making IV: An Informal, Good
Faith Approach,” Administrative Law Matters, online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.
com/blog/2020/01/15/human-rights-in-administrative-decision-making-iv-an-informal-good-faithapproach/> [https://perma.cc/4GY7-8NQH].
215. Supra note 10 at para 119.
216. Ibid at para 120.
217. Ibid.
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Additionally, as noted above, there is at least some judicial and
academic disagreement over whether Vavilov actually does impose stricter
reasonableness review. While, as I have noted above, it appears that
Vavilov is stricter than what TWU imposed, if Vavilov does not impose
stricter reasonableness review, then this option is not fairly available. This
is an issue that has divided courts, already. But while it is possible that
Vavilov is not as strict as what preceded it, there is at least a question over
its status.
3. Synthesis
Which approach is ultimately adopted is a matter of assessing the
benefits and drawbacks of both bifurcation and stricter reasonableness
review. As noted above, bifurcation has the support of precedent; but
it seems to run afoul of both Doré and Vavilov. On the other hand,
stricter reasonableness review largely brings Doré in line with Vavilov’s
conception of reasonableness review; but it has nothing to say about the
role of correctness review and the classically understood role of the courts
in enforcing constitutional guarantees.
Which understanding is adopted is ultimately a matter of the art of
the possible. To my mind, the Court is less likely to want to upset the
theoretical underpinnings of Doré through bifurcation. What is desirable
is an approach which does the least violence to Court’s existing body of
precedents. Bifurcation would wholly undermine Doré without much in
the way of imposing reasoning requirements on decision-makers, making
Vavilovian reasonableness review quite different from reasonableness
review in the constitutional context.
On the other hand, stricter reasonableness review is a likely candidate to
renovate Doré in light of Vavilov. A template for this stricter reasonableness
review already exists in Vavilov, and so it would be relatively easy for the
Court to transpose it to the constitutional context. Additionally, if the Court
is so inclined, it can keep the theoretical underpinnings of Doré intact
while synthesizing it with the arguable true basis of Vavilov: the guidance
it gives on the reasonableness standard. Perhaps more importantly,
stricter reasonableness review will impose the “culture of justification”
animating Vavilov across administrative contexts. No matter if the context
is constitutional or run-of-the-mill legal interpretation, administrators
will have basic reasoning requirements with which they must engage.
This unified culture of justification arguably supports Doré ’s underlying
premises while keeping Vavilov intact.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper has argued that there is a conceptual gap between
Doré and Vavilov that requires some sort of correction. Vavilov threads
together two schools of administrative law thought: a classic school
championed by A.V. Dicey, and a newer school focused on inculcating
a “culture of justification” in administrative decision-making. On the
other hand, Doré is largely premised on a functionalist understanding
of administrative law, and perhaps secondarily by an understanding that
promises administrative contributions to the enterprise of law-making.
These schools of thought are not necessarily diametrically opposed; but
they do lead to different doctrinal applications in certain areas.
As a result, what is required is a doctrinal approach that bridges the
conceptual gap between Vavilov and Doré. This paper reviewed two: (1)
bifurcation and (2) stricter reasonableness review. Both have their benefits
and drawbacks, but stricter reasonableness review has the added benefit of
synthesizing Doré and Vavilov on one important point: the content of the
reasonableness standard, across the board.

